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Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, by John Borrows
Abstract

The metaphor of Justice McEachern - the trial judge in the famous Aboriginal title case Delgamuukw—and
his “tin ear” is useful in describing the disconnect between settler law and Aboriginal ways of life. We have
seen this tin ear time and again in our legal system, whether it’s the inability of Canadian evidentiary laws to
accept oral Indigenous evidence or the difficulty judges have in applying Gladue principles to the sentencing
of Aboriginal offenders. We have seen it in the reluctance of courts to recognize Aboriginal spirituality under
the Charter and in the narrow framing of section 35 of the Constitution, a framing that has only reaffirmed the
settler belief that Indigenous peoples are “‘once-upon-a-time’ groups that can only occupy a very narrow space
in contemporary democracies.” John Borrows new book, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, explores
the quest for freedom (dibenindizowin) and a good life (mino-bimaadiziwin) for Indigenous peoples in
Canada, and what stands in the way of achieving it. As Borrows explains, freedom is not just the “absence of
coercion or constraint.” It is the ability, alongside others, to “choose, create, resist, reject, and change laws and
policies that affect your life.” Unsurprisingly, one of the main barriers is the law’s continued inability to attune
itself to Indigenous values, wishes, and beliefs. At every turn, Canadian-European legal traditions have
remained inattentive— and sometimes even indifferent—when Indigenous peoples have fought for freedom.
We once again see the tin ear of the law. Borrows’ book is a careful call to arms; a thoughtful manifesto on how
to resist, litigate, protest, and educate in search of a space where Indigenous peoples may live freely and pursue
a good life most in line with their own dreams and aspirations.
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Book Review

Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism,
by John Borrows1
LILLIANNE CADIEUX-SHAW2
Chief Justice Allan McEachern: I don’t want to be skeptical, but to have witnesses singing
songs in court is, in my respectful view, not the proper way to approach this problem.
Mr. Grant: Well, my Lord, with respect, the song is what one may refer to as a death song.
It’s a song which invokes the history of and the depth of the history of what she is telling.
McEachern: I have a tin ear, Mr. Grant, so it’s not going to do any good to sing it to me.
Transcript, Delgamuukw v The Queen, 1991.3
THE METAPHOR OF JUSTICE MCEACHERN—the trial judge in the famous

Aboriginal title case Delgamuukw—and his “tin ear” is useful in describing the
disconnect between settler law and Aboriginal ways of life. We have seen this
tin ear time and again in our legal system, whether it’s the inability of Canadian
evidentiary laws to accept oral Indigenous evidence or the difficulty judges

1.
2.
3.

John Borrows, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2016).
JD 2017, Osgoode Hall Law School.
John Sutton Lutz, Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2008) at 276. See also Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1991] 5 CNLR 5,
79 DLR (4th) (BCSC).
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have in applying Gladue principles to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.4
We have seen it in the reluctance of courts to recognize Aboriginal spirituality
under the Charter5 and in the narrow framing of section 35 of the Constitution,
a framing that has only reaffirmed the settler belief that Indigenous peoples
are “‘once-upon-a-time’ groups that can only occupy a very narrow space in
contemporary democracies.”6
John Borrows new book, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, explores
the quest for freedom (dibenindizowin) and a good life (mino-bimaadiziwin)
for Indigenous peoples in Canada, and what stands in the way of achieving it.
As Borrows explains, freedom is not just the “absence of coercion or constraint.”7
It is the ability, alongside others, to “choose, create, resist, reject, and change laws
and policies that affect your life.”8 Unsurprisingly, one of the main barriers is the
law’s continued inability to attune itself to Indigenous values, wishes, and beliefs.
At every turn, Canadian-European legal traditions have remained inattentive—
and sometimes even indifferent—when Indigenous peoples have fought for
freedom. We once again see the tin ear of the law. Borrows’ book is a careful call
to arms; a thoughtful manifesto on how to resist, litigate, protest, and educate in
search of a space where Indigenous peoples may live freely and pursue a good life
most in line with their own dreams and aspirations.
Each chapter of Borrows’ book outlines a different path for carving out this
space, and each path rests on Anishinaabe laws and stories to make the point.
In exploring these paths for freedom and the quest for a good life, Borrows is
careful to note the dangers these paths can lead to—he warns that, “like the
trickster, freedom can wear many false faces.”9 Freedom is not the ability to do
anything we want, nor is there one path to the good life that we should all force
ourselves along. Freedom and the good life are a “living tradition” that we create
on an ongoing basis, facilitated by Indigenous legal practices and relationships
within a community. Freedom is resistance against that which confines Indigenous
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

For an exploration of the use of oral evidence in the courts, see Bruce Granville Miller, Oral
History on Trial: Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2013). For a review of how Saskatchewan judges have been giving overly-harsh sentences
for Aboriginal offenders, see James TD Scott, “Reforming Saskatchewan’s Biased Sentencing
Regime” Saskatoon Criminal Defence Lawyers Association (2014), online: <spmlaw.ca/scdla/
JimScott_sentencing_bias_2014.pdf>.
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2015
BCCA 352, 387 DLR (4th) 10.
Borrows, supra note 1 at 13.
Ibid at 12.
Ibid.
Ibid at 17.

Cadieux-Shaw, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism 969

peoples “within essentialized, authentic categories and frameworks.”10 With this
in mind, Borrows explores a number of different paths that may get us there.
The first chapter, or path, explores the idea of mobility, an integral tenet in
Indigenous peoples’ pursuit of freedom. This means both mobility in a physical
sense, with the ability to move freely across the countries Indigenous groups
have traditionally called home, and mobility in an intellectual sense, with the
ability to move “across the broad world of ideas.”11 Legal systems have often used
mobility against Indigenous peoples: If they are too nomadic, the state will try to
narrow and confine, or say that title has not been established through connection
to a specific space. But if they are too static (in time, for instance), courts will
limit rights and block Indigenous journeys through time, mired as they are in
stereotypes of Indigenous groups as “past-tense peoples.”12
In this, I am reminded of Cherokee writer Thomas King’s hilarious discussion
of authenticity, and how the Canadian state has taken upon itself the task of
determining what is truly Indigenous and what is not. King writes:
For us Live Indians, being invisible is annoying enough, but being inauthentic is
crushing. If it will help, I’m willing to apologize for the antenna on that house at
Acoma. I’ve already shaved off my moustache, so that should no longer be an issue.
If I didn’t live in the middle of a city, I’d have a horse. Maybe two. I sing with a drum
group. I’ve been to sweats. I have friends on a number of reservations and reserves
around North America. I’m diabetic. If you can think of something else I can do to
help myself, let me know.13

Borrows picks up on this idea (and continues to do so throughout the
book), writing that courts have often fallen for an “exceedingly narrow view of
who constitutes an authoritative Indigenous person, and thus what qualifies as
Indigenous tradition.”14 To prevent this essentializing, and to further freedom of
mobility through time and physical space, Borrows urges us to “recognize and
affirm Indigenous patterns of mobility,” so that courts, judges, and the public are
aware of the stereotypical and limiting views of Indigenous mobility currently
being perpetuated.15 Further, Borrows recommends first that Indigenous peoples
be given the freedom to regulate their own communities and integrate others
into it themselves; this would avoid “freez[ing] ideas about who is authentically
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid at 129.
Ibid at 13.
Ibid at 33.
Thomas King, The Inconvenient Indian: A Curious Account of Native People in North America
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012) at 64.
14. Borrows, supra note 1 at 34.
15. Ibid at 39.
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Indigenous.”16 Second, he recommends that Indigenous and non-Indigenous
laws be harmonized, spreading Indigenous legal traditions among Canadian
society and broadening Indigenous paths of mobility.
A second path to freedom focuses on civil “(dis)obedience” (with the
brackets reflecting that what you are disobeying is a matter of perspective;
Indigenous disobedience to settler laws can just as easily be viewed as obedience
to Indigenous legal traditions). In this chapter, Borrows reviews a number of
Canadian examples of Indigenous groups using blockades and direct action to
fight for their rights. Some examples show where civil disobedience has been
an effective practice, achieving both short- and long-term success. Others show
where civil disobedience was not successful in the short-term but did provide
some long-term benefits. Still other examples show where civil disobedience has
backfired, failing to “open up any meaningful democratic space, [and] thereby
further eroding Indigenous freedom.”17 Borrows collects lessons to be learned
from these examples for those who may wish to use civil disobedience as a tool
for reform in the future.
A third path for reform is through resistance to and engagement with
Canada’s constitution and its formation. Specifically, Canada’s constitutional
formation is founded on the importance of a ‘free and democratic’ society
and on the importance of the constitution as a “perpetual work in progress,”
as emphasized by the living tree doctrine.18 But Indigenous peoples have been
left out of this ongoing formation. The effects of colonialism are ever-present,
even today. And the constitution has never been a welcoming document—
constitutional entrenchment looked, to many Indigenous peoples at the time,
as a shackle rather than a tool for freedom. Most legislation had been adverse to
Indigenous aspirations, after all. Despite this, Indigenous peoples have been, and
should continue to be, engaged in the constitutional formation of our country.
Branching off slightly from this path allows us to stumble upon a similar
but distinct barrier to freedom: (Ab)originalism, a play on words referring to the
courts’ use of originalism as an interpretive principle when it comes to interpreting
Aboriginal rights.19 This reveals Canada’s “interpretive inconsistency”20—that is
to say, courts in Canada have vocally committed themselves to the living tree
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ibid at 42.
Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 105.
Borrows first explored this idea in an article written for Osgoode’s Constitutional Cases
conference. See “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev 351.
20. Borrows, supra note 1 at 15.
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doctrine of constitutional interpretation, where our constitution is interpreted
with a mind to the future change and growth of society … except when it comes
to Aboriginal rights. Section 35, in particular, has been interpreted in such a way
as to freeze Aboriginal traditions in time, relying on an originalist interpretation
that isn’t used for any other kind of constitutional interpretation. Borrows explores
the troubling line of section 35 jurisprudence highlighting this interpretation,
arguing that it rests on the assumption that the rights protected in section 35
must belong to some “pre-existing historical essence.”21 Borrows provides three
key alternatives for the courts in interpreting Aboriginal rights. While this is an
insightful chapter, it does not engage with originalism beyond the Aboriginal
context, nor does it engage with other academic critiques highlighting where
originalism has shown its face in other places.22 This doesn’t fully contextualize
originalism in the Canadian constitutional context. Still, Borrows provides
compelling examples where Aboriginal rights have sometimes been unduly
narrowed and framed by an originalist interpretation.
A fourth path to freedom is through legislation that can help advance
Indigenous self-determination in Canada, though Borrows is quick to caution
that this must be done carefully; legislation has historically been a dark cloud
over the path to Indigenous peoples living free and good lives (the Indian Act
being a prime example).23 Borrows looks to the United States for some examples
of legislation that gives more Indigenous control over services, that protects
Indigenous cultures and communities, and that allows Indigenous control over
natural resources and economic development.24
Lastly, freedom and a good life must be sought through focused effort on
addressing violence against Indigenous women. Specifically, Borrows returns to
his concern about how section 35 has been framed. It has been overly focused
on land and resource conflicts at the sacrifice of protecting human rights issues
such as the shocking violence Indigenous women experience in Canada. Borrows
recommends that section 35 be put to work, providing both constitutional
protection of Indigenous peoples’ bodies and a right to self-govern, so that
21. Ibid at 141.
22. See e.g. Leonid Sirota & Benjamin J Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian
Constitutional Jurisprudence” (17 March 2016) Working Draft, online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2749224>. See also Kerri A Froc, “Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious
Case of Canada’s “Equal Rights Amendment” (2014) 19:2 Rev Const Stud 237.
23. For an overview of the origins and impact of the Indian Act, see generally, Ken Coates, “The
Indian Act and the Future of Aboriginal Governance in Canada” (May 2008) National Centre
for First Nations Governance, online: <fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/coates.pdf>.
24. Supra note 1 at 166.
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Indigenous groups may properly address the violence in their own communities.
Indigenous governments must be allowed responsibility for the “health, safety,
and well-being of their members.”25 This view stems from Borrows’ argument
that violence against Indigenous women should particularly be addressed through
a “jurisdictional perspective,” which would give Indigenous communities the
constitutional power to deal with the inequalities exacerbating this violence.26
It would have been interesting for Borrows to explore other mechanisms for
addressing violence against Indigenous women, perhaps through a properly
executed criminal law—this would focus more on enforcement rather than
constitutionalism and jurisdiction. Borrows is quick to note, however, that this
troubling issue is one that “must be confronted at all levels of society.”27
It is hard to say where Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism fits within
similar literature because Borrows has created such a unique book, simultaneously
philosophical and practical, both a legal treatise in its own right and an ode to
Anishinaabe traditions. It is a well-researched and thought-provoking critique of
colonialism, but its greatest contribution is its thoughtful solutions for moving
ahead, for carving out paths in the fresh snow so that others may follow, for
suggesting ways to create a country that respects the freedom and quest for a
good life that our country’s first peoples are fighting for.
In light of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s findings, we are all
becoming more aware of the history of our country, a “history of broken promises.
Of illness and death. The loss of land. The indignity of colonization.”28 As such,
Borrows’ book will be a powerful read for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous
readers alike. It is for those interested in Borrows’ academic arguments about
(ab)originalism or for those interested in the practical arguments about civil (dis)
obedience, for those who want to find new tools to dismantle the master’s house
or those looking for new uses of old tools. It is a book for those that may be
frustrated by the law’s tin ear, and for those that want to play a role in attuning
our country’s laws so that they may more fully listen, understand, and respond
to Indigenous peoples in their quest for freedom and a good life. I encourage
all to read it.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Ibid at 202.
Ibid at 204.
Ibid.
R v Sledz, 2017 ONCJ 151 at para 16, 2017 CarswellOnt 3692.

